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In this paper we analyze ganes in which there is trade between in! ontnl
ard uninformed players. The infont know the value of the trade (for
instarce, the value of their productivity In a labor market exaxple); the
uninformed only cn.r the diztrihzt ion of attribites aITorq theinformed.The
informed choose actions (education levels in the Spence iwel); the
uninformed cthoose price (wages of interest rates). We refer to gaits in
which the informal iraie first as signaling gaii —theychoose actions to
signal their type. Games when the uninfon1 rove first are referred to as
screening gan. We show that In sequential equilibria of screening games
sate contracts can generate positive profitsantothers negative profits,
while in signaling games all contracts break even. However, if the
irxiifference airves of the informed agents satisfy what ra4fly would aitnint
to a single crossing property in two dinensias, an'i sate ttnical
corditioris hold, then all contacts in the screening game break even, ant the
set of cntocres of the screening gane is a subset of the outaztes of the
oorresporxiing signaling game.
In the postscript we take a broad view of the strengths ant weakness of
the apnach taken in this ant other papers to prthl of asynuretric
information, ant present recxnierdations for ha., futhre researth should
prsi in this field.
Josert Stiglitz Ardwu Weiss
Stanford University Boston University








Inrecent year. • good deal of interest has focused on markets with
asynetric information in which some of the participants have information that
the other participants seek to acquire. Often information can be interred
fro, the actions taken by the informed participant.. The uninformed may try
toinduce the informed to take actions that convey information and the choices
of the informed ire influenced by the information conveyed by those choices.
Of course, actions also directly affect the payoffs of both the informed and
uninformed. In general the actions taken and the information transmitted is
likely to be sensitive to details of the economic environment. Weshallfocus
on one .aipect of the economic environment: whither informed agents move before
or after uninformed agents.1
In models of markets with ssyetric information the equilibrium outcomes
are sensitive to assumptions about how participants react to previous moves.
It seems reasonable to assume thatindividuals react optimally; however, the
definitionof an optimal reaction is likely to depend on the economic context
ofthe problem being analyzed. We shall specify below what we mean by optimal
*Thispaper was first written in June 1981. We have revised it slightly for
this volumetotake into account recentdevelopments in the literature. We
weresurprised to find that the point, we made at thattime arenottotally
irrelevantto the ongoing debate on these issues. Thepostscript and various
footnotes coment briefly on some issues that have arisen since we wrote this
paper.
1 Throughou.tt this paper we restrict our analysis to competitive environments.
clearly, equilibrium outcomes in non—competitive environments will differ
markedly from those in competitive environments.—2—
reactions:clearly optiaal reactions can dependon the beliefs of the people
going second concerning whomadea particular move,
In suchappliedresearchon marketswithasyastric information the
informedmovefirst. ThesemodelsincludetheStiglita (1982) and
Bhattacharya [1980)model,in which (informed) firma issue dividendsthat
convey information about the true
profitabilityof the company to investors
who areuninformed; the Nilgroa and Robertsf1982) and Salop [1919] models in
which firmsknow their cost functions andchoosea pricewhich signals their
production costs to potential entrants whoareuninformed; and the Weiss
(1983) model of education in which individual.,whoknow their own abilities,
choosea level of schooling which signals theirproductivity. All of these
models sharethecharacteristic that the informed participantsmove first,
choosing a price, education level or dividendpolicy, andtheuninformed then
respond. The actions that the informedagents take mayormaynotfully
reveal their private information.Typically these models generate a
multiplicity of equilibria including some in which all theinformed choose the
seas action (pooling equilibria) end some in whichthey each choose different
actions (separating equilibria).Consequently models of this sort can be used
to explain whyindividualsgo to school, even if schooling is unproductive, or
whyfirms pay dividends, despite the adversetax effect,of that practice.2
On the other hand, in some modelsunreasonableequilibria emerge that
seee dueto peculiarities of the model orthe definition of equilibrium
employed rather than the underlying structure of themarkets. For example,
supposethat firmsbelievethat if anyone chooses other than 8years of
education that person has zeroproductivity, then equilibrium will be
characterized by all individuals choosing 8years of education. These beliefs
2 The literature arguing that dividendsare paid because they provide a signal
concerning the firm's net worth is, however, not completelypersuasive,
Presumably, buying back shares would provide an equally effectivesignal, at
much lower cost. On the other hand, we show belowthat there mayexist
signalling equilibria which are far from Pareto efficient.Perhaps the
dividend signalling equilibrium is a dramaticexample of this.-3-
at.unreasonable.Or suppose investors believe that any company choosing a
dividendpay out ratebelow 5%of netasset value La in Stn.nt dangerof
bankruptcy and value the stock accordingly, thsn one equilibrium is
characterized by all solvent firma paying a 5% dividend.
Fatalist to the treatment of markets in which informed agents move
first—make choices to which the uninformed respond—have been analyses of
markets in which the uninformed participants move first. Early treatments of
thisproblem were byStiglitz (19751 Riley[1977,1979),Rothschildand
Stiglits (1976] and Wilson (l977j. In the Stiglite and Riley papers
uninformedfirms offerwage contracts—a wage conditional on an education
level—and informed individuals react to those wage contracts by choosing the
education level that maximizes their utility. In the Rothschild—Stiglitz—
Wilson papers uninformedinsurancecompanies offer contracts and customers
choose their most desirable contract given their probability of an accident
andtheir risk preferences.4
We refer to models in which the informed move first assignalingmodels—
the more desirable informed agents signal who they are.5 We refer to models
in whicfr the uninformed move first asscreeningmodels—contracts are designed
to screen the more desirable agents from the less desirable ones. One quality
shared by signaling and screening models is that they generate surprising and
often counterintuitive results. In signaling models there are often multiple
3 The order of moves in the Spence model (1973.19141 is somewhat ambiguous.
Spence(1976] interpretsSpence (1973Jas the informed agents choosing
educationlevel. before firmamake wageoffers. Onecouldalso view the
originalSpence model asa simultaneous move game.
4 Ehattacharya (1980), Weiss(19803, Cauach and Weiss (1980,19823, and Salop
and Salop (1976), Laxear and Rosen (1981) and Kalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)
among others have modeled labor markets where uninformed finsfirstoffer
wage contracts and individuals then apply to the firmofferingthe most
advantages contract given their charactejristics.
5 Since we first circulated this paper this terminology haa become
coonplace. Spence (19761 refers to a modelinwhich the informed move first
as a passive response model.-4-
(optimal reaction) equilibrIa,s of which sea implausible;inscreening models a pun strst. squilibrjoften don not exist.6 Thati., there is
no set of contracts offsr,4 by all thew%inforaed agents that would notinduce at lint on, uninlora_edparticipant to offer a contract different fromthe one
assigned him, Thu. it would appearthatthe set of outcomes when the
uninformed move first is a subset oftheset of outcomeswhenthe informed
movefirst (a claim along these lineswas mad. in Spence (19763 in th,context of active and passiveresponse, to signals.)This conjectureturns out not to
be strictly correct. Inparticular when the uninformed move first
(sequ.ntial) equilibrium outcomesmay be characterized by some contracts
gensrating positive profits and othersgenerating losses for the uninformed.
These outcomes cannot arise when theinformed move first. Only when the
parsmeter valu.s of the proble, are sucha. that these contracts are not
offered in equilibrium, are we ableto prove an inclusion relationship,
In the screening literature theequilibrium notions customarily used
implicitly impose optimal reactions by theinformed agents to any contracts
that are offered (whether inequilibriu, or not). The signalling literature
faces a. Sore difficult problem:informed agents (who move first) must makean
inferenceabout how the uninformedagent. will respond to any action
(including any out—of—equilibrium action)they take. What are the optimal'
response, of uninformed agent, dependson the inference, they draw, and it is
notalways clear what those inferences will,or should, be when there are
heterogeneous agents. This isparticularly truefor'out of equilibrium'
actions: for the theory predicts thatno rational agent will take those
actions. Consequently, in thesignaling literature the optimal reaction
assumption is not always imposed (for example, itis not present in Spence's
signaling models,)
In this paper we define optimalreaction equilibria for both screening
and signaling modela. Forscreening models the optimal reactionequilibria
6See Rothachild_Stiglitz (1.976J, Cuaschend Weiss (1980, 1982), Bhattacharya
(19801 and Riley (1979J for examples of models inwhich equilibria fail to exist.-'-
sr..ubgaperfect or Stack.lb.rg squilibriawith the uninforsd as leadsrs
anddi. informed asfollowers.(They canalsobe describeda. twostags games
in whichthewinforasd move first.)
For signaling models, optimalrsactionequilibria at, roughly equivalent
to sequential equilibria appropriately .odifisd to allow for continuous action
spaces. Following Krspa—Wilson (1982j we implicitly assumethatall
uninforned agsntsisv. the sam. beliefs andthatthey react optimallygiven
the..beliefs, (and thestrategies of all agents) to the observed actions.
Beliefsassign to each action a probabilitydistribution of sgent. taking it,
and have the followingpropertie.:
(a)the equilibrium combination of strategie. and belief, cannot
contradict ona another: if the equilibrium strategy combination calls for
only player I to choose action a then uninfor.ed agents seeing action a must
believe that it was chosen by player I;
(b) if out of equilibrium action, were to be observed, uninformedagents
could not believe that those actions were taken by agents that are not present
in the economy or by agents for who, they are not feasible;
(c) beliefs cannot be contradicted by the observed distribution of
actions. For instance, suppose there are two equal sized groups I and 12 of
informed individuals. Members of groups 1 have single feasible actiona1
(the only inference consistent with the observation that precisely half the
informed chose a is that actions other than a1 were taken only by members of
group12).
Aswe shall see in the examples in section 2, assumption c is quite
strong. However it is necessary if belief. are to satisfy Bayes Rule. These
restrictions on beliefs motivate the restrictions we place onstrategies when
weformally define optimal reaction equilibria. Laone nightexpect, in many
models there will be several optimal reaction equilibria. On the other hand,
theoptimal reaction restrictions eliminate some of the least reasonable Nash
equilibria in the same way they are eliminated by imposing sub—game perfection-4-
or sequenttality.
The principal result of thispap.r is that if vs restrict ourselvesto
economiesin.wtttchtheonly contractsrealised in •quilibriu. are onesthat
breakeven, then th.set of outcomesof theoptimal reaction equilibria when
the uninformed movefirstat.a subsetofthe optimal reaction equilibriawhen
the informed move first. But therestrictions needed to eliminatepositive
profit contracts are surprisinglystrong.
Thisresult canbest beunderstoodbyconsideringreasonable reactions to
out—of—equilibriamoves ineachgame. When the%minfor.ed movefirst, the
optimalreactionsof theinformedtoOut—of—squiljbrimoves are dictated
solelyby thepreferences of the informed agents. When theinformed move
first, however,the optimalreactions of the uninformed toout—of—equilibrium
movesdependon their beliefs about which agent(s) tookthose moves as well as
on their preferences. Hence, there ismore leeway for bad reactions to out—
of-equilibriummoves when the informed move first than whenthe uninformed
move first.
Inan optimal reactionequilibrium whentheuninformedmove first
unreasonable reactions are precluded. Theinformed g.jygg choose their most
desirable contracts fro, the set ofcontracts being offered; and the -
uninformedknow this. Hence the uninformed haveno uncertainty about the
matching ofinformedagents to actions in response to any set ofcontracts.
Profit maximizing behavior by theinformed oreciseli determines the actions
that would be chosen inresponse to all, price schedules, including those not
offered in equilibria.
When the infor.ed move first it ispossible for the uninformed to believe
that if an out—of—equilibriaaction were chosen, that itwaschosen by the
7 In many game theoretic formulationsof general signaling games stronger restrictions on beliefs are imposed suchasthe Choand Kreps intuitive criterion,or Divinity or Universal Divinity in tanksand Sobel. There is somecontroversyover whether these stronger restrictionsare not too strong. We have choeen to mak, weakassumptions about beliefs andallowthe reader to draw upon thi particular features ofthe market(s) that interest him to
justifystronger restrictions on belief,,—7—
lsaet desirable informed agent.Thesepessimistic beliefs could deter
informed agents from departing from their assigned actions.Consequentlyby
allowing for pessimistic beliefs, outcomes that are precluded in the optimal
reactionequilibria when the uninformedeon first may be sustainedas
equilibria when heinformedmovefirst. Since pessimisticbeliefshurt
informed agentstakingthe action to which those beliefs apply. we consider
thosebeliefs as punishing the agents taking the associated out—of—equilibrium
action, and thusenforcing theequilibria.
.1.A GEN&&&L hOtEL
Inthis section we describe the general class of markets with whichwe
are concerned.Becausethe structure of the modeldependson the order in
whichmovesoccur, we postpone our discussion of the strategies of players in
each game(informed moving first,uninformedmoving first and simultaneous
moves) until afterwe have described the preferences and available actions and
information of the participants. We will allow agents to onlypursue pure
strategies.
Thpte are finite lets IandK of informed and uninformed agents
respectively. Sets I and K each have at least 2 members. Informed and
uninformed agents trade with one another, and the terms of trade can be
predicated on the action taken by an informed agent.
Each informed agent Ichoosesan action a tAi,whereall are compact
sets in Rn. We defineA as UAi. Action a has cost c(a,(1)) 'K1for agent I.
Werefer to all informed agents with the same feasible set A and same
c(sjt)) functions asbeingthe same type. Each informed agent makesone
transaction (e.g. chooses a level of education and worksfora single firm.)
Thereare constant returns to scale in transactions for uninformed
agents, so the number of trades an agent makes doe. not directly affect his
netpayoff per transaction. Each uninformed agent kchooses a price pfor
eachaction a c A. The price p is the monetary transfer from the uninformed
S This is a restriction on the strategy space of uninformed agents. For
instance, it rules out strategies In which the uninformed agent fixes the
ratio of the numbers of trades he is willing to engage in at different prices.to the informed,and maybe negative.Uninformed agentsare uninformedonly about theidentityof theinformed.Ifan action isfeasibl,for sor, than
one informed agent,uninformedagentscannotdiscriminate among agents
choosing that action.
We allowuninformed agents to beeither buyers or sellers—so thatprices
refer either to theprices they pay as buyers or theprice, they receive as
sellers.(When the uninformed are sellersp istypicallynegative.) In
sorting models oftheeducattoneeployment market, uninformed firmsare buyers
of labor service.. The action isaneducationlevel chosen by individuals,
and the price is the wage that a firm offersto pay workers with a given
education level. The reader will find ithelpfulto keep the education
example in mind throughout most of thispaper. In the Rothscbild5tiglitz and
Wilson models of the insurance market,uninformed insurance companies are
seller, of insurance. The action is theamount of insurance customers demand,
and the price iu the cost of insurance fora customer demanding a given amount
ofcoverage, and—c(a,(i)) is the value individual i places one unite of
insurance coverage.
The expected value to an uninformedagent from a tradewithan infoned
agent randomly selected (with equal probability) from theset J choosing
action a is S(a,J). In the educationexample S(a.(L)) is the expected value
of the labor input of individual I witha years of education.The expected
payoff of this trade for an uninformed
agent offering price (wage) p for that
action is I(a,J)—p. The uninformedare buyers: p is the wage and S(a,J)—p is
the fira'a expected profitper worker hired with education level a and paid
wage p. When the uninformed are sellers, S(a,J) is
generally negative and
refers to the cost of providing thegood (or service) to a buyer that is
randomly selected from set J. However, we wouldagain emphasize that the
paper can be most easily followed by keeping in mind the educationexample inwhich the uninforasd are fir.s hiring workers, theactions areeducation
levels chosen by vork.re, and thepricesarethe wag.. paid by firms to
workers.
To ensure that therealway,exists a Their action or set of actions for
informed agents, so that payoffs are defined for all combinations ofpric.i,
wei.po.s the tschnical restriction that any price schedule offered by an
uninformed agent .ust be upper semicontinuous.
The preferences of agents are to maximize their expected payoffs.9 This
i.spliee chat informedagentsalways trade with the uninformed agent offering
the highest price for their selected actions. The payoff for informedagent £
choosing action when p is the highest price offered for actionis
p—c(a,1).Inthe education employment example this is the worker'.wage
net of his cost of education. We adopt the following tie—breaking rule.: if k
uninformedagents are offering the maximum price (wage) for action (education)
a.aninformed agent choosing action itradeswith each of the. with
probability1/k. If thenetpayoffs for contracts offered in equilibrium are
identicalat two or more different actions, we assume that informed agents
choose the action at which the profits of the uninformed are highest. Finally
we assume that an agent participates in the market ifand only ifthe expected
payoff from participation is greater than or equalto zero.
Thereis coon knowledge about the parameters, and distribution of
agents in the econosy. In particular, all agents know the elements of I, each
Ai, and for Va the values of c(a,(1J),andS(a,(L)).
CASE1:UNINFORMED AGENTS MOVE FIRST
Inthis case the uninformed choose a price schedule, the informed then
choose actions. Finally each informed agent automatically trades with the
uninformed agent(s) whose contract yields the highest payoff to that informed
agent (with ties broken as above.)We shall notallow the uninformed agents
to predicate the price schedule they offer uponthe subsequently observed
9These are simplifying assumptions. Our results are valid for a moregeneral
class of preferences v(a, 1, p) as would be required in the insurance example.—to.—
distributionof realized action. of the informedag•nts. 10 Thusthestrategy ofuninfor.,dagent kisthe price schedul. Pk:A. R.This sp.cifl.s the
price th.kth Ig,fltoffers to any informedagent choosing action a.Theupper
envelop, of the., price schedules is anupper seaicontinuoaa function denoted
by ?; that is,VsP('a) —arPk(a).Since the informed agentsundertaking
action a alwaystradewith the uninformed agent offering thehighest price for
th, action, trades will onlyoccur along the pric, locus P.
The strategies of informedagents are potentially more complicated: they
observe all the prices offered beforechoosing an action (though only the
upperenvelopeofthose price schedules is relevant fortheir payoffs.) LetH
denote the setof feasibleCombination. of price schedules and x bean element
of II. Then a strategy combination forinformed agents is described by a
function I: Ix II•A;((Lw) describes the action chosen byagent I when the
combination of price schedule, wobtains.r'(a.g) denotes the set of informed
agents choosing action a under fwhenw is the combination of price schedules
beingoffered. For any setof price schedules r andstrategy combination of
informed agents, the set of actionsa for which
(a.i) is non—empty is denoted by A.
Definition 1. ANash equI1ibri whentheuninformedvefirstis a
combinationof strategies (P. .Ptf*)such that, given the strategies of all
other players, no uninformedagent k couldincrease his expected payoff by
offering a price schedule 1k"tk' andno informedagent .1 could increase his
payoff by choosinganaction a.sf*(i4where —(Pt .
This definitionof equilibrius places no restrictionson the reactions of
informed agents to combinations ofprice schedules other than •*•
10If the uninformed wereable tomake the price they offer for action a be a function of the distribution of action.takenby the informed, the distinction between the informed moving first andthe uninformed moving first would be blurred. By precluding contingentcontracts of thatform we preserve the distinctionbetween the informed moving first and theuninformed moving first.—Il—
In th. context of the •ducation exawl.,suppose Vi: S($,i)—c(5,i) >0.
On. Nnh equilibria would b. for (uninformed) firms to offer awag. •qual to
the average productivity of a randomly selected workerifall worker, were to
have S years of schooling, and a nra wag, to any worksr choosingother than 8
yearsof schooling and for ill (informed) individuals to choose 8 years of
sducationregardless of the vege offers of firms.Notethatanyindividual
choosingotherthen 8 years of education is worse off thanifhe hadchosen8
years of educetion, while no firmisbetter off by offering a positive wage
for education levels other thanSsince no individual chooses education levels
different fro. S years.
Clearly this equilibrium is unreasonable. Analyses of models of
asynetricinformation when the uninformed move first have eliminated
equilibria of this sort by implicitly or explicitly imposing an optimal
reaction assumption. Optimal reactions such as those generated in a
Stackelberg or subgsme perfect equilibrium of this game assume that whatever
price schedules are offered, each informed agent must reactby choosing the
action thatmaximizes his expected payoff. These reactions are anticipated by
theuninformedagentsbefore they offer contracts;hence, they determine
responses to possible out—of—equilibrium moves. The reasoning behind this
restriction is that it is reasonable to expect the informed agents to choose
actions which yield the winpayoff for any price schedule.
Definition 2. .. ,t I) itan optimal reaction equilibrium whenthe
uninformedmovefirst (OWF) if (Pt... ,P, satisfy the conditions for a
Nash equilibrium andV1. tU.')—a c arg max (*() —c(a,i)).If
a
ergmax (') has are thanonemember,agentI chooses theactionin thatset
seA1
whichmaximize,•(a,i)—P*(a).If several of those actions maximize
flaX) —Pt(a)they choose each with equal probability.
TheORUF coincide with the sub—game perfect equilibria. The additional
restrictions imposed by ORUF are particularly compelling since they only
eliminate equilibria which use dominated strategies.—12—
CASE2. INFORMWAGENTSMOVE FIRST
Inthiscasethe informed firstchoose actions. The uninformedthen
offer price schedules. Finally, each informed agent autoaatically tradeswith
the uninformed agent whose contract givesthehighest payoff to the informed.
7or example, individuals first go to school, fins thenofferwages
conditional on years of education, and, finally, each individualgoes to work
for the firm offering thehighest wage given theselected level of education.
Sincethe informed choose their action. before the uninformed choose price
schedules, the actions of the informed agents cannot depend on the price
schedules of the uninformed. For this game weshall,let •denotea strategy
combination for the informed agents; *:I•A.Thus(I)describesan action
chosenby agent Land *_l(a) denotes the set of agents choosing action a.
The set of actions for which *(I) is non-empty ii denotedby 1.(Theuseof
thesea.notation a. in case 1 eases the exposition.) On the other hand the
uninformedagents choose price schedules after having observed the
distribution of realized action. of the informed agents. Let 2' denote the set
of observable distributions of the actions of the informed agents, tT, is a
particular observed distribution of actions.
Turning now to the strategies of the uninformed agente, letdenote the
price offered by agent k to any informed agent choosing action a' when the
distribution of actions is t, so that An'•ê. Thatis, for each flY,
agent kmaychoosea different upper •emi—continuous price schedule. Note
that a price maybe offeredfor actions which were not chosen; those prices
are irrelevant for the equilibriua payoffs but do affect whether a strategy
combination is an equilibrium,
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium when the informedvefirst is a
combinationof strategies 4.* such that, given the strategies of
all other agents,nouninformedagentk could increase his expected payoff
by offering a priceschedule
k"kandnoinformed agent i could increase
his payoff by choosing action a £ such that a0(i).—13—
A.sin the previous game the Nash definition allow,forunreasonable
equilibria.V. shall now apply the logicbehindthe Kreps— Wilson notion of a
sequential. equilibrium to defineanoptimal reaction equilibriu, for this
geae.Weconsider reasonabl, restrictions on p(.), the maximu, price
offered by the uninformed agents in respons, to different actions.The
motivationfor therestrictions we imposeis:
a)All thsuninformed agents have the same beliefs abouttheprobability
distribution of agents choosing an out—of-equilibrium action, if such an
action were observed;
b) these beliefs are consistent with the feasible action spaces of each
informed agent and the observed distribution of actions, t.
Definition4. An optical reaction equilibrium whenthe informed agents
ve first (OVE) is aNashequilibrium with the additional property that
YaeA,teT,p(.,t) mm9(a,! )whereIisanynon—emptysubset of
Ici a,t at
a,t
theinformed agents for whom action aisfeasible, and1atchoosing a is
consistent with having observed t.
Inthecontext oftheeducation example, the definition of ORtFprecludes
thehighest wage offers madefor out—of—equilibrium education levels being
belowthe valu, of the lowest labor input that any worker could possibly
achieveat that education level.
Inthe special case where A isdiscrete, the outcomes of the set of ORIF
coincidewith the outcomes of sequential equilibria. (Sequential equilibrium
11Whenthe informed move first therear. no proper subgaaes.Consequently
subgame perfection doesnot reduce the set of Nash equilibria.—14—
is not defined when A is continuous.) Our definition avoids both the
additional notation rsquirsdby beliefsLaXreps—4JLlson andtheco.plexity
inherentin applying th.ir concept to pass with continuous action spec...12
ix.son ninw
V.can most readily show how the ordering in which players move affect,
the trades realizedasoptimalreaction, or Nashequilibria throughaseries
of simpleexamples.These example,areintendedto serve aspedagogicaltools
toillustrate some problemsthathavearisenin analyses of markets with
asyetricinformation. Sincethe point of these examples is purely
illustrative,weshall not describe the outcomes forevery definitionof
equilibrium andorderingof move.. To canthe notation and shorten the
exposition,whennoconfusion would result,weshall usethenotationpa)
andp(a) todescribeprice offers that are independent oftheobserved
combinationsof actions. (When the notation p(a) is used for agame inwhich
theinformed move first, the reader should assume that all uninformedagents
are offering the same price schedule, and the strategies of the wiinforised
agents are such that prices an independent of the observed distribution of
action.) This section can be skipped without loss of continuity. Interested
readers nay wish to glance at example 4 where positive profit contractsare
outcomes of ORUP equilibria.
Example 1.
Thefirst example illustratescasesin whichthere areNashequilibrium
ofboththe signalingandscreeningmodelsthat are clearly unreasonable.
There are two types of informed agents1 and 12.A type11 agent can only
12The restrictions we have imposed on the strategies of theuninformed inthe
ORIF equilibria are quiteweak, yet, aswe shall see, they are not sufficient
to generate the subset relationship OWW C DRIP conjectured by Spence. Cho
and KEeps impo.e stronger restrictions in a somewhat differentsignaling game
and show that given their restrictions the outcome when the informedmove
first coincides with the outcome when the uninformed movefirst (ifthelatter exists).—is—
choos,actiona. A type 2 agent canchoose•itheractionora2.All
actions are costless. Ths expected value to an uninformed agent oftrading
with a randomly selected type I agentchoosing action j is denoted by S.
Theexpectedvalue to an uninformed agent oftrading with a rando.ly selected
individual choosing action whenthatactionis chosenbythe entire
populationis
Suppose0 <•12<< < Thu.. the uninformed valuetrade with
a type2informed agent choosing actionmore highly than with a type 1
informed agent choosing action 'l They also value a trade with a type2
agentchoosingaction a2 more than if that agent chose action £1. One
characterizationof the moves in a Nash equilibrium, regardles, of whomoves
first,is for both informedtypes to choose action a1,and for the uninformed
tooffer pricesp(a1) — andp(a2)— 0.The strategies of the agents in
eachgameareto makethese moves regardless of any observation of the moves
ofother agents. An uninformed agent offering Pk(al) > •l would generate
losses, k'l < •lwould not attract anyinformed agents.P(a2) pd 0 would
al.onotattract any informed agents —recall thatthedefinition of Nash
equilibrium holds the strategies of all other agents fixed, and all informed
agentsare choosing action alregardlessof the observed prices. Similarly no
informed agent gain. fro. deviating from action'1 giventhe equilibrium
contracts offered by theuninformed. Although the strategy choices of the
uninformedsatisfy the criteria for a Nash equilibrium they see. unreasonable.
Only type 2 agent. can choose action a2; one would imagine that in equilibriua
they would choose thatactionand be appropriately rewarded. Amore
reasonable combination of moves that is also su.tained as a Nash equilibrium.
regardless of which agenta move first, is for the type 1 informed agents to
choose action I, type 2 to choose action 2 (again these choices are made
independently ofobservedprices) and for uninformed agents to offer prices
p(a1) —1l'p(a2) —
Whenthe uninformed move first, therm is also a positive profit (albeit







£ (12.w ) —a1•
for is
whereZjdenotesa type1agent, and 12 denote, a type2agent. In this Nash
•quilibrium the contract, offered to agents choosing action break even, the
contractsofferedto agents choosing action a2 make positive profits. Any
contractoffering a higherprice than 3foraction a2wouldprecipitatea
moveby the type 2 agents gjfromtoa. Thu irrational response by the
informedagents would decrease the expected payoff of the uninformed agent
deviatiM from that equilibrium. (Recall thatirrationalresponses to out—of—
equilibrium moves are permitted by the definition of a Nash Equilibrium.)
Let usnowconsider the case where the informed movefirstand the
uninformedreact optimally (ORIF). The only OR!? equilibrium I.
All agents of type 1 choose a1






Bothtypes choosing a1 is not an equilibrium because the informed know
thatprofitmaximizing behavior by theuninformedwill cause them to offer
fr(apt) —if action12is observed (this i. the optimal reaction which is
consistent with profitmaximizingbehavior by theuninformed agents).—17—
Similarlyifth.uninformedagents v.first,th.only optimal reaction
equilibria is the separating on.. P(a1) — Sjp — •22. An uninformed
agent ows thatifuninformedagents offerth.pooling contractP(ai)— ii..
then a contract Pk(a2)—•22( with 0 <i< —will attractonlytype
2 agents and earn positive profits. Thu.., in this example, the realized
actions and payoffs in the optimal reaction equilibrium ar, the same
regardlessof whomoves first.
Rn.pte2.
Weshalt nowmodifyexample I. to show thatboth ORIFandORUFequilibria
mayfailto maximize output.We now assume action a2 isavailable to type1
as well as to type 2,and let the expected value of a trade with type I.
choosing2 be
Suppose that
0 C < 12 < #1 < 2 < 11 < 22
If the informed agents move first there are several combinations of moves
characterizing optimal reaction equilibria (ORIF) in this example.
(i) Both types chooseand VtT,
p(aj,t)—
p(a2,t)—•21
Implicitly, the uninformed expect that if action 2 is chosen it is chosen
by type1.




In this case the uninformed expect thatif actionis chosen, itis chosen
by type2.Both of these pooling equilibria are sustained by pessimistic
beliefs by the uninformed: out—of—equilibrium action. are only taken by type
1.
(iii) If we were to change ourassumptionon how informed agents choose
actionsin casesof indifference there is athird catrgory of CRlF equilibria.—11—
Thoseequilibriaare characterized by actionSI and 'zbeingchosen by the
informed agents in proportions such that th.valu, ofa trade with a randomly
selected agent choosing either action isidentical. For instance one OR!?
equilibriua has all type 1 agents choosing'2 and the proportion of type 2
agents choosing action a2 being such that the values ofa trad, with a
rando.ly selected agent choosing actiona2 is —•12The uninformed then
offer P(al)— P(a2)— Wehave not restricted the expectations ofthe
uninformed except that (a) given theirexpectations the strategies of the
informed suat be consistent with thoseexpectations and (b) the expectations
must befeasible. In each of these OR!?equilibria, resources are being
misellocated.Agent I does not necessarily choose the action whichmaximizes
None of the OR!? equilibria described thus farmaximize output. Output
ismaximized if type 1 choosel and type 2 choose Those choices will
only emerge as en OR!? equilibrium if the self—selectionconstraint is
violated—in particular type 1 would prefer thecontract received by type 2 to
their own contract. Because of ourassumptions that the distribution of
realized actions is observed by the uninformedbefore they choose price
schedules, and that there is a finite number of informedagents it is possible
toconstruct such an equilibrium. We proposethese equilibria as curiosities.
Theydepend on the action chosen by a single individualaffecting the
distribution of prices paid by the informed.
Supposethere are 1type2 agents. Let12denotethe belief the
uninformedagents have about the expected vslue of a trade with anagent
choosing action if the numberofagents choosing a2differsfrom 1. Then
if < there is an output maximizingOR!?equilibrium:
Type1chooses aj.
Type2chooses a2.
For tsuchthat 2agentschoose a2, p(a21t) 22 and p(a11t) —
Fortsuchthat a 02agentschoose a2, p(a2t) — andp(a1•t) S—1,—
On.aotivationfor these •tratsgi.s is that ths uninforaedbelievethat
ifthey obs.rvs a • I agents choosing action a2 thin the proportion of type I
agentschoosing '2 is sufficiently large thattheexpectsd productivity of an
agent randoalyselsctsdEra.aaongthoss choosing a2 La
This OR!? squilibrius violates the self •election constraint usually
imposedin models with asyaetric information. type I agents are choosing
action 11 although, holding the contracts fixed, they would do better it they
choseaction a2. However if any type 1agentwereto switch to action a2 the
distributionof actions observed by the uninfor.ed wouldchange causing them
torevise their beliefs insuch a way asto make the type 1 agent regret
having switched to action a2.
The existence of an ORIF equilibriua that violates the self—selection
constraints does not depend on the uninformed observingthe entire
distributionof actions. If they only observed the support of that
distribution—whichactions Verachosen— an ORIF equilibrius could still
violatethe usualself—selection condition. This result can easilybe seen in
the context of our exsaple by assuming that there is only one typeI agent.
Thestrategies of the informed arethat the type i agents choose action a1.
Thestrategies of the uninformed agents are:
Ifa1 is observed p(a2It) —•22
p(a1,t) —1l
Ifa1 is not observed p(a2.t) —
Againalthough the type 1 agent prefers the contract offered for action
a2, if he stopped choosing a. then action a1 would not be observed, and the
distribution of price schedules would change accordingly.
If the uninformed move first there is only one opti.al reaction
equilibrium in which each contract breaks even: the uninformed agents offer
P(s2) — andP(a1) <•2and both types of informed agents choose action
a2. Note that in this ORUF equilibrium type I agents are choosing the action—20—
which minimize, S(a,IO.Resource. are being•isallocated. Becaus, actions
arecostless there cannot be an C&I.JP equilibria where the twotyp.sof
agentschooss diffsrsnt actions. Thustheoutput maximizingaction.cannotbe
outcomesof an OtUF squtl.ibriua.
Thus fir neither of our examples have dealt with what is often considered
the quintessential. problem in tin analysisof market with imperfect
information—nonexistenceof equilibria. To discuss that problem we need
toexpandthe action space of theinformedagent..
Wn..pl.3.
Thisexample illustrates theSpence modelof the education market. The
informed agentsar. individual, and the action they choose is an education
level. The uninformed arefirms offering a wage level.Thestandard result
thatequilibriummaynotexist in this market only applies to ORUF equilibria.
Spence'soriginal specification ofmultiple equilibria in this market can be
formally Justified if weconsiderORIF or Nash equilibria—regardless of the
orderingof moves. To be precise, suppose the set of action. available to the
informed agents is the open interval A —(O,i)and actions are costly, where
cost to a type i individual of action a is cia and c1 > c2. We simplify the
exposition by following Spence in assuming that actions do not affect the
value of a trade with a given type. The value of a transaction with type i is
denoted the expected value of a transaction involving a randomly chosen
individualfrom the population is 1 and< •< and—
c1aC0. In
thisexample there are again manyNashequilibrium outcomes regardless of the
orderingof moves. For instance all informed individuals choosing the same
action; Aandthe uninformed offering prices
—I
and for a 0Z, p(a)—0
is a Nash equilibrium for any A (end tit for the case when the informed
move first). There is also a Hash equilibrium characterized by type 1
choosing aa*,—IL—
* — •_4+ca*




uninformedchoosing pricesp() —•2' p(at)—•i,and p(a)— 0 fora .m
(a*,s). A type1iinobitter off choosing £ type 2 is worse off
choosingaid .andno uninformed participantcanbe madebetter off,given
thestrategiesofthe other participants;by offeringcontractsotherthan
those•p.cified. Letusnow considertheoptimal reaction equilibria when the
informedagentsmove first (ORIF). The set of optimal reaction equilibria
where bothtypeschoose thesame action(poolingequilibria)are
characterized by for YtT,c A,
anda.', D￿p(a,t) ￿ 1—
c1a
There is also a separating equilibria. Type 1.chooses •* —0and type 2
•
2 In this example,the restriction imposed by the optimal
I
reactioncondition only eliminate some (notall)of the separatingNash
equilibria when the informed agents move first. -
Ontheotherhand in this example there maynot exist an ORUF
equilibrium.First, we know there cannot be e pooling equilibriumwhere both
types choose the same action.The proof iibycontradiction; a pooling
equilibrium where both types choose action would becharacterized by
—1.
1stsomauninformedagentIc offer a contract —1.•2 >1>1
and> ,suchthat
C1&•j>1— i>C2(1 Z1
This contract attracts only type 2 individuals and makes positive
profits. Notice that for this example genericnonexistence of a pooling
optimal reaction equilibrium when the uninformed movefirst depends on the set
of actions available to the informed being an open set.To break the pooling
equilthrita in our example it is necessary thatthere exist some ; >.if
A were a closed set LO.']. and if further assumptions weremade concerning 82—22—
and c1L an 01117 equilibrium could be charact.rised by allinformedagents
choosingaction I.(Inthat case a competitor casmot break theequilibrium by
offering a contract contingent on an action greater than a, .inc. those
actionsar. notfaasibl..)
Th...boundary problemscould also be avoided by assuming that
2—
C 0. Thsn an individual rationality constraint precludesan ORUF pooling
equilibrium at
An optimal reaction equilibrium in which sacktypeofinformed agent
chooses a different action (sorting) doss notezistif, for all action., acA
satisfying
— ac1 S
(a necessary condition for type 1 to be dissuaded ftc.choosing the same
actionchosen by type 2) it is the case that
—
ac2CI.
Inthat case for an equilibrium contract to only attracttype 2, it must
require an action so large that if an alternate contract —7 — £ Were
offered; icouldbe .ade sufficiently small that it would attract bothtypes
and oak, positive profits.
Example 4.
Our finalexample illustrates an OMITequilibrium that is characterized
bysome contracts generating positive profits and others generating losses.
Assuch it clashes with analyses which were motivatedby the same
considerationsa. our ORUF yetin whichpartofthe definition of equilibrium
was thateachcontract generates zero profits.
Weassume there are three types of informed agent.(1.2.3) and an
intervalof available actions A— [1,3) — 10for i —J — 0for i 0j.
c(j,i)—21a—i)so that the cost of action Jforagent i istwicethe
absolute difference between the agent and the action.
There are twice asmanytype 2 agents aseithertype1or type 3, (there
are equal numbers of type 1 and type 3).—23--
Finally that. at. 2 untnfor.ed eefltt (i.JJ.Their strangLe, an
Pi(ai) —11
—9
for a 0(a1,a23Pi(a) —0
F '2 —
Pj(a3) —11
for a 01a2a3).Pj(a) —0
The optimal reactions of the intoned agents are
type 1 chooses a —I.
type 2 chooses a —2.
type 3 chooses a —3.
Each uninforned agent earns positive profits from contract but if he
raised thepricehe offered he would attract a different type and generate
losses. -
Diagraaatically,the situation is illustrated in Figure 1.
The locti I, 12, 13 plot the indifference curves of types 1, 2, 3
respectively through the contracts they choose in equilibrium.
Each contract offered by the uninformed earns zsro profit. and resources
are efficiently allocated (there is no dead—weight loss.) No uninformed agent
can offer a new set of contracts that would make positive profits.
I L(L RI
U—24—
III.4 FACIAL ORDRPJNC OF EQUXUSRIA
before proceeding we need to introduce some additional notation.
Defining an outcome a. a mapping of individuals to action—price pairs, let
denot. thesetsof outcomesin0MM?and Ott?equilibria respectively.
Lana 1:tnboth the optiwal reaction and the Nnh equilibriawhen the
informed v.first, all contracts generst. zero profits.
This result is trivial. The uninformed observetheaction of the
informedand compete with one another driving their profits to zero.
because of the poseibility of nonzero profit contracts when the
uninformed move first, it is not true for all economies thatG C• (see
example 4 above.) However, if we impose the following restrictions on c(a,i)
and S(a,i) we can eliminate ORUF equilibria in which some contract,generate
non—zero profits.
Al. li a I, Ai is convex,fla,i)is continuous in Au and c(.,i) is
continuously differentiable,
£2.For any pair of contracts C4),ti, such that there is atypeS
that isindifferent between those contract,, then no type Jøi can
also be indifferent between that samepairof contracts. (Note that
this a.sumption is analogous to the usual assumption that
indifference curves satisfy a single crossing property in a one
dimensional action space.)
£3 If B denote. the union of the boundaries ofAi. then for VatS, YhI,
S(a,i) —c(a,i)<0.
Assumption A3 ensures that the equilibrium contract will lie in the
interior of the action space of all agents. If a contract were on the
boundary of the fea,ible .et of actions of some agent then, notwithstanding Al
and £2, itmightnot be possible to attract that agent while repelling other
agentswhoeither are also choosing that contract or who crcindifferent
between that contract and the contract they are choosing in equilibrium.
Lena 2. If Al, A2, £3 hold then each contract in an ORUF equilibrium
generates zero profits.—25—
Froot.
IfYath, F(s)>•(a,r(a.t)),then firma generate lossesandwouldbe
better off offering prices that did notelicitany trades. Thus 3acA, such
thatF(s) S•(e,r1(a,.)).(RecallthatAisthe setof realised action.
whentheuninformed.ove first.)
Consider ath suchthat F(a)<•(a,r¼a..n.Then,given the
preferencesof the informed and uninformed agent., that contractmakes
positive profit, and hence is offered by every uninformed agent. For anyacA
such that P(a) >•(a,r'(a.w))that contract is only offered by one uninformed
agent: If two or more uninformed agents were offering the pa.. money losing
contract, one of those agents could increase its profits by Lowering its
so that no informed agents would purchase its contract •without
affecting the distribution of actions chosen by the informed agent..
Thu., if some contracts make positive profits and others make losses,we
would find all the positive profit contracts being offered by aU the
uninformed agents and each negative profit contract being offersd by a single
uninformed agent. The negative profit contract would offer the highest price
consistent with preventing informed agents taking it from switching toanother
contract—the only reason negative profit contracts are offeredis because of
their sorting effects. Because uninformed agents canchoose to offer prices
which do not result in trades we know that in equilibriumalt uninformed
agents make non—negative profits. Assume someuninformed agents sake positive
profits equal to ..Consideran uninformed agent k whose profits areless
than or equal to the average for the uninformed.That uninformed agent could
perturb the equilibrium price schedule by offering aprice schedule (a) —
1(a)+1(a), where.(a) is everywhere positive but arbitrarilyclose to zero;
the 1(a) function is chosen so that no informed agentchooses a different
action from those induced by 1(a). (Our assumptionthat informed agents are
risk neutral is sufficient to ensure the existenceof such a function.) That
contract enables the uninformed agent to capturethe entire market and earn
profits that are arbitrarily close tothe average profits times the numberof—2 &—
uninformedagents•which, ofcourse exceeds the averag, profits,Since we
havechosen agentksuchthat itsoriginsl profits vets no greater than the
average,this deviation is profitable foragent k.Therefore an ORUF
squilibriacamiotbe characterizedby any uninformedagent making positive
profit..
Thus It.only possibility leftto considar is that each uninformedagent
offersa co.bination of contracts so.. of which losemoneywhileothers wake
money.Eachcombination breaks even. The positiv,profit contracts are
offered by all the uninformedagent.. Each loss generating contract i.
offered by only one uninformed 'agent. Informedagentschoosingmoneylosing
contracts are indifferent between that contract andat least one positive
profit contract. Consider a contract (.) thatgenerates positive profits.
(From£3, lies on the interior of every setAi.) Let$ denote the set of
typesof agents whoareindifferent between IZ,andthe contract they are
choosing,which could be (, ).LetJ denotethe typeofagent with the
eteepestindifference curve in the two dimensionsl surfaceX Pthrough
whereAk i. the kth dimension ofthe action space. From £2 there is
onlyone .uch type, and j'e indifference surfacethrough (,)does not pass










SupposeJischoosingtp,a) andtrade withthat type isprofitable.
Then fro.Al,£2, £3,andthe previousasstsptionthat thereisa finite
number of types of agent., a contractcanbeoffered in ths neighborhood of
(,)thatattracts only type j, and all of the.. Fro. Al and the existence
of sevsral uninformedagentoffering contract I,). this new contract
enables the uninformedagentoffering it to make positive profits. Suppose j
is choo.ing (,)andtrade withjis unprofitable for the uninformed. Then
fro. Al,£2,A3, one of the uninformedcouldoffer a price schedule with the
followingtwo properties:Oneofthe contracts, (p*.a*), liesin the
neighborhood of (.&)andiipreferredto (.a)byevery type in S except
j and type j prefers (,a) to (p5,at); and for every actiona4 chosen by
an informed agent, the new price schedule induces those agents to choose the
same actions by offering a price that is slightly higher than that offeredin
th.initial equilibrium. Thusthe deviating firm attrscts every type except j
atan arbitrarily small change in price, andinthe actions chosen by any
agent. Since there is a discrete number of typeJagents,etch of whoa
generatedlosses, and since aggregate trade with the informed broke even, the
new price schedule would makepositive profits. It would approximate the
profits ar.d losses from all trades in the neighborhood of theold trade.
except those at tp*,a*) and would make discretely greater profitsat (p*,a*)
than at (,iJ.Finally,if j is choosing (,}andtrade with j breaks
even,then consider thetype of informedagents whose indifference curves
through(,s)inAkx P space has the second steepest slope, and proceed as
before,If trad. with thattypealso breaks even, continue until reaching a
type with which trade generate. non—zero profits.
1(0w suppose Jchoosestp,a) .' (,a) and causes losses on contract
(,I)forthe uninformed agent offering that contract. There is a contract
(p*a*) in the neighborhood of (,lthatallinformedagents in Sexcept
type j prefer to contract t;,aiandtype j prefers t3,a) to this new
contract. Any uninformed agent not offering (,a}couldnow offer this new
contract and contracts in the neighborhood of all the oldcontracts except—2$—
sothatallinformed typ.. continu, to choosecontracts in the
neighborhoodoftheir previous contracts. Fm. Al and the•quilibrium
condition thateachuninformed agent break. even this new set ofcontracts
generates positiv, profits.The newsetof contracts approximates the sum of
theprofits and losses frau all trades except thos, atcontract t5,.
Sincetradesat Ii,) generatedlosses and the set of all previou, trades
generate. zero profits, by omitting only trades withtype j the new set of
contracts generates poiitivs profits.
Therefore, an equilibrium could not exist in which ther,are positive
profitcontracts because a new contract (or set of contracts) could beoffered
that generates positive profits for theagent offering that contract(s).
Theorem 1. Given Al, A2, A), 6. CO.
Proof:From Leatta 1 and 2, regardless of theordering of coves in an
optimal reaction equilibrium, YacA,thehighest price being offered is equal
to the expected value of a trade with arandomly selected agent choosing that
action, and no informed agent will wish to deviateto a different contract
within I.Alloutcomes with these properties can be generated by Nash
equilibria regardless of the order of coves in the game.13The maximum price
offered for action so could bearbitrarily low in a Nash equilibrium of
either game, thus sustainingany combination of moves with the two properties
cited above. The outcome in has the additional restriction that deviations
to aS are awarded contracts p(a) t am•(a,(iJ). Thus there is some
if'
boundon the penalty for departing the action, specified in 01(1?that is not
imposed on the penalties in a Nash equilibrium. Thislower bound precludes
some combination of play. which aresupported in a Nash equilibrium fraubeing
supported asanOflF equi1ibrin, but not conversely.
The penalties for deviation, from action,epecified in 01W? do not merely
havea lower bound; they are precisely determined. Ifa price schedule P(a)
13 There are also combinations ofmoves without these properties which are
Nash equilibria....5 examples 1 and 2.—2,.-
— P (a) is offered that induces so.. action af Z,thatactionitchosen by
all agents(andonlythanagents)for who.
- kai — c(a,i) >P(f(i,w)) —c(f(i,w),i).
Since thesereactionsare knownby allagentsin theORUFequilibrium
competition amongtheuninformedagentscompletely determines thecontract
offeredforaK:VacA;2(a) —t(a,r1(a,w)).
Since S(a,rt(a,w))>.tn S(a,i), thrsats in the ORUF to punish out—of-
t''
equilibrium behavior are less onerous than inanORIF equilibrium. Since
equilibriumoutcomes are supported by these more onerous threats, C 8.
IV.
I.Because the agents moving second could have strategies which depended
on the observed distribution of moves of the agents moving first. Nash
equilibria in these models mayhavesome peculiar properties. In particular.
if the uninformed move first, choosing price schedules before the informed
choose actions, the strategies of the intoned agents could enforce a positive
profitNash equilthrium)4 The possibility of unreasonable positive profit
Nash equilibria when the uninformedmovefirst seems to be a basic feature of
these models. If the intoned move second, for them to choose the action
which maximizes their expected payoff they must know the upper envelope of the
price schedules of all agents. Hence the actions chosen by each informed
agent is a function of this upper envelope. However, that condition would
allow the informed agents to change their actions in such a way as to penalize
an uninformed agent for raising his price(s), thus enforcing a positive profit
Nash equilibrium when the uninformed move first. Obviously strategies of this
form make little sense.
14 The converse is not true. When the informed move first, competition siong
the uninformed will result in their earning zero profits. This is because
while peculiar strategies of the uninformed could force the informed to choose
almost any actions, once those actions are chosen the uninformed will bid for
the informedby offering prices that break even. There is noopportunity for
eitherthe informed or uninformed to usestrategiesthat penalize high (or
low) prices. We have assumed that after the informed choose their actions,
they musttrade with the fin(s) offering the highest price for their action.—30—
2.The reader should also note that ourdefinition of DRIPequilibrium
is consistent with Ut. Kreps—Milson definition ofsequential equilibriumin
allowingextremely pessimistic bsliefsabout which agentstook out—of—
equilibrium actions. In Weiss(1983) more stringent restrictionsVera placed
on the belief, of the uninformed agents when faced without of equilibrium
actions. That paper defined a Robust ExpectationsEquilibrium (REE).It
assumed that all agents with thesameequilibrium strategy (and for whom the
out—of—equilibriumaction wasfeasible) are equally likely to have chosen a
particular out—of—equilibria action. Because theWeiss(1983) results are
si.ilar to ours, we .uspect that Oi,CO holds for a broad cla.s of
definitions of equilibrium.
3.Manyrecentmacro—economic models havebeen concerned with the effect
ofexogenousshocks on the equilibriumof an economy.If the exogenous shocks
wereobserved bytheintoned butnot bythe uninformed,then,even ifthe
uninformedmovedfirst, optimalreactionswouldnotbe sufficienttoenable
the uninformedto know which intonedagents would choose which contracts.
The uninformedwouldnot be able to offer contractsthatseparate theintoned
agents,sincethe preferences of the informed would be affectedby these
exogenous shocksthat are unknowntothe uninformed.
V.POSTSCRIPT
Sincethis paper wa,written in 1981 there has been con.iderable research
doneongametheoreticmodelsofmarketswithasymeetricintonation. In this
postscriptwe shall trytoconnect the approachwetook with current research
on modelswith asynetricinformationandconentonthe direction we think
researchin this fieldshouldbe headed
Host re.earch on the nature of equilibriainmarkets with intonational
a.yetrieshas focused on what we have calledsignaling games (Rosenthal and
Weiss (1984), Wilson (1980) andDasgupta and Naskin (19861 are exceptions).
That research has been directed towardconstructing new definitions of—31—
equilibriathateliminateunreasonable Wash equilibria of the sortpresented
inthe examples in section 2 of this paper, and r. particularly find a
unique equitibrium. For instance Cho and KEepsshowthat by imposing the
intuitive criterion" on a particular foraslation of the Spine, signaling game
there is a unique equilibrium outcome of the signaling game: the Pareto
efficientseparating equilibrium. SimilarlyNoldeke and van Dane obtain
uniqueness in a different formulation ofthe Spines signaling game by imposing
their*plauaibility criterion.
Wethink the quest for a single correcr equilibrium notionthatwill
predict the precise outcome for any signaling game is unlikely to be useful
for understanding real economic problems. Details of the economic structure
of the market being analyzed and the entire history of all relevant
interactionsare likely to have important effects on behavior in almost any
interesting economic setting.
Onereasonfor this is that,as wehave seen, the natureof the
equilibriumdependsoninferences that participants sake about out—of—
equilibrium moves and the consequence action. whichthosemoves give rise to.
These inferences will be sensitive to the economic context in which the out—
of—equilibrium move occur., and the history of past interactions. The
standard theory assumes that participants are rational, knowthat other
participantsare rational, know all thepayoffs,and do not make mistake..
Oneinference that couldbe drawn from observing an action which a theory says
should never occur is that some aspect of the theory is wrong. Which aspect
ofthe theory is thought to be wrong will depend on the precise nature of the
out—of—equilibrium move, and the economic context in which it took place.
Sincethese inferences could favor the deviator, there will be situation, in
whichit will be in the strategic interest of one participant to make what
would appear, in the standard theory, to be an out—of—equilibrium move (though
from e different perspective, a move which is fully rational.) For instance.
it maybein the interest of one participant to be thought of assomeonewho
frequently sakes mistakes.-'32—
On.way to address these tssu.s is to forailac.aod.1 in whichthere
are zwout—of—,quiJ,ibrium ev.nts, All feasible observations occur with some
probability,either because of a rich heterogeneity in thetypes of
participants, or becaus, of a variety of kinds of errors.13With the latter
approach the results maybshighly dependent on the particular nature of
•rroreintroduced. Thustheremaybeno general theory (although theremaybe
a general approach)sincethe sourcesand nature oferrors iii one market
context saydiffermarkedlyfromthose in another. In general,participant, willhave a subjective probability distributionover the reasons for out—of—
equilibrium acne.
There is a second reason that institutional andhistorical considerations
will almost inevitably be drawn into a relevantanalysis of equilibria. One
of the lessons we have learned in thepast decade is that the nature of the
equilibrium of a gam. is highly dependent on theprecise specificationof the
game.A slight refor1sulat ion of the standardRothschild—Stiglitz insurance
modal can yield the quite different solutiondiscussed by Wilson. Standard
gem.theoreticmodels have participants forming beliefs andmaking inferences
in an introspective manner; theirreasoning is based on asking what would a
rational individual do In such a situation? Butto mak, those inferences, two
things are required: (a) each participant must know(or believe) that the
other participants have precisely thesame (correct) understanding of the
files of the gsa.; and (b) there must becoa.on knowledge of rationality, that
is, each participant must not only believe that hisopponent is rational, but
that his opponent believes that he isrational, and that his opponent believes
that he believes that hisopponent is rational..Neither of these assumptions
arereasonable, and it is certainly not reasonable toassume that all
participants have confidence in the reasonableness of theseassumptions.
15 Nyerson (1979) focuse. on mistakesin the evaluation of payoffs. Weiss
(1933) and Simon (1987) focus on unintendedactions.—33—
Notbstn.gableto precisely model .11 the rslevant details of anymarket
interactionand nottrustingtheir judgmentsabouttheappropriatenessof
particularmodels, individual, tend to rely heavily on past experiencetomake
inferencesand judgments about their beat course of action.
There are still other reasons that anhistorical—institutional approach
isrequired. In many models, therearemultiple equilibrium. There is no
way,by introspection alone, that individuals can figure out what it is that
their opponents are likely to do. History provides a natural coordinating
mechanic, for the choice of equilibria; unfortunately, history does not
necessarily choose Pareto efficient equilibria.
Of course, even after we acknowledge the importance of history in
selecting an outcome in the current period, questions remain astohow the
past outcome. came about, under what conditions will a particular outcome
persist, will future outcomes be near or far from those in the recent past,
and bow will the outcomes change over time. For instance will outcomes
cycle? All of these questions are, of course, closely interconnected.
In the end, the strongest argument for an historical—institutional
approach, is this: economics is a behavioral science; itisconcerned with
explaining a particular aspect of social behavior. In most contexts,
individuals rely heavily on past experience to make inferences and judgments;
they seldom rely exclusively, or even mainly, on introspective analysis. The
question of why this is •o remains a legitimate subject for enquiry.
It is perhaps worth noting that not only are our views supported by
general observations of behavior, both of firms and individuals, but our views
have also been widely confirmed by experimental evidence. Even in the
simplest finitely repeated prisoner dilena games, the predictions of standard
gametheory are not borne out. The persistence of—what appears from one
perspective to be—unreasonable outcomes may be due to past learning or
enculturation that teaches the players to value a particular process as
opposed to payoff. For instance, if players are taught that cooperation is
good,irrespective of the payoffs, then players might even cooperate in a one—-'4-
shotprisoner's dileaa game.
Clnrlywhether or not a particular past interaction isrelevantis a
subjectivedecision of the participant. in the market. Itwill be difficult
for researchers toreach a consensus concerning whichaspect,ofthe past are
relevant. However because Judgingrelevanceisdifficult doe,notimply that
the entirehistory ofpastinteractionsis irrelevant,Inparticular, we
would argue that the choice, the uninformed madein rasponse to action. chosen
by a previous cohort of informed players will affect theactions the current
cohort of informed player. choose. (Note whilewe are very sympathetic to the
forward induction argument. made by Kohlb.rg andHerten.u on the importance of
a particular player's past actions as eignale of thatplayers future actions,
weare making adifferent point.)
Thepoint. we have justmademaybe illustrated by the employment—
education relationship which has motivated much ofthe literatur, on signaling
models — including our own analysis.Currently, the standard treatment of
that problem has become to considera single informed agent whose type is
randomly chosen from some distribution. The informedagent then chooses an
education level (action) and the keyque.tion addressed by most research in
thi, field is how fins react toout—of—equilibri.a education levels
(actions).
inpractice however, many individual, simultaneously choosewhether or
not to continue in school. in makingthesedecisions they observe the wages
offered to current and past school leaver,at different education levels.
Thusalthoughnot a repeated game, since both the players and thestate
variables change over time1 informed and uninformedagents will infer from the
outcomes of the previous period what payoffsthey are likely to receive in the
next period. 16
16 Not only ie there considerableexperimental literature showing that
equilibrium outcomes tend to persist,even if they are Pareto inefficient, but
looking across countries it is hard to account forsome of the variations in
pattern, of sducation in other than historical ten...—33-.
It does not strike us as a fruitful exercise to seewhatthe outcomes of
aparticulargamewould be the first timeit, or anysimilar,game were
played.It fleas to be a better operating assumption to think that history is
always relevant and that that. is flayer a first period. Consequently we would
arguethat ahistoric models (including our own) are seriously flawed, and that
in trying to explain equilibrium outcomes researchers .ustnotonly take into
account strategic considerations of the participants, but also the history of
past play of this and similar gases and any other relevant experience, of the
participants.Indeed history (broadly defined to includelearned notions of
fairnese)mayevenenforce what appear to the analyet to be unreasonable
equilibria.
Similarly,the inferences drawn fromout—of—equilibrium moveearelikely
to depend critically on the context. For instance if an equilibrium analysis
suggests that no one should drop out of school within one week of graduation
fro. highschoolnor should anyone pursue Lees than one year of Junior
college, th.inferencesthatpotentialemployers are likely to draw about a
person whodroppedout Justpriorto graduation are likely to be different
from the inferences drawn about a person whowenttocollegefor one week.
Thelatter is likely to have discovered he didn't like that college or college
in general, the former is unlikely to have discovered one week prior to
graduation that he so disliked high school that he didn't want to continue for
the last week and graduate. In the caee of the college dropout the
unanticipated move can best be explained bymisperceptionsof one's own
tastes.In the case of the high school dropout the unanticipated move may be
best explained by irrational behavior or by some exogenous event.17
We have emphasized the difficultiesofmaking Judgaente about the
appropriateness ofparticularequilibrium concepts in the abstract; one must
17Inthehigh school attended one of theauthorsa student changed schools
Just priorto graduation because twoof hisfellow students, with whom he was
not on friendlyterms,wereobserved carrying guns.—3'-,
analys. behaviorwithin particular context..Indiviesalsareseldo,in the
single—play,one period context envisaged in some standardforulations. This
may explain why, when we plac. the, in experimental situations
corresponding
precisely to thou. theoretical models, they so frequently behaveinwayswhich
arenot consistent with the "thsory.They .xt.nd to these highly stylized
and unrealisticsituations mode, of beh.vior thatwere adapted to the more
co.plex, dynamic environments in which they live.
Rscent attempts to develop more dynamic mod.lssesm to us to represent
one of di. mor. fruitful lines of on—going research. Whilewe have noted one
aepect of this—the developsent• of historic odels, in whichindividuals use
past experience to formulate their expectations_thereare three others to
which we would like to call, attention.
First in this paper, we have contrasted models inwhich the informed
move first with those in which the uninformed move first.But the question of
who moves first should not beexogenously imposed.tie not only need to Iaiow
which of these assumptions is moreappropriate in various market contexts, but
why.
Second, even in simple (one shot, no repeated play)markets, there may be
complexdynamics, Elsewhere (Stiglitz—Veiss, 1907), we haveprovided one
detailed example, in the context of the creditmarket,whichwe have analyzed
asafour move geme, Banks announce a set ofpolicies; borrower,make
applications; banks decide whichof the applications to accept; and finally
borrowersdecide which of the loan offer, they wish toaccept. Equilibria in
these multi—move (but single transactionperiod) games may be markedly
different fro. those analyzed in thesimpler games discussed in this paper.
Deciding on the appropriate order of moves when transactionperiods overlap is
likely to affect the results of any analysis and islikely to require a
detailed understanding of the marketbeing analyzed.
Third, many of the action, involved insignalling and screening games
take place over an extended period of time.They involve, as we have already—37—
noted,sequential decision Wing. And there sayorsay notb.reversibility.
Consider .od.ls in which firs'sissuance of equity is used as a signal. If
ownsrschaos not to issu. equity it indicates that they believe that returns
are high, and accordingly, potential buyers will, pay sore fortheirshares.
But the original owners are, in general, not coitted to retaining their
ownership share. forever. Having sold some of their shares at a high price
(because purchasers believed that they were going to retain their shares),
they say subsequantly sell sore of their shares, at admittedly a lower price.
Implicitly, earlier theories ssuuaed that the original owners could sake a
coitment not to sell their share, in the future. In the absence of such a
coitsent, market equilibrium is markedly different Eros that characterized
bythe earlier models. (See Gale and Stiglits (1986)).
Similarly, in the education market, individuals makedecisionsabout
whether to go to school for one sore year on a year to year basis. The
dynamic equilibrium sayentailpooling, in contrast to the standard model,
where individuals at birth commit themselves to a level of schooling.
The (partial) reversibility of soma actions also introduces some inherenc
ssysintries into the choices of agents. An individual that drops out of
school after 9th grade can later choose to resume her education. k college
graduate cannot later choose to have had only 11 years of education, With
imperfect capital markets consumption today precludes investing tomorrow, but
saving today leaves open the option of saving or consuming tomorrow.
To sum up, we think that future research in the economics of information
should have one or several of the following feature.:
I. It should be explicitly dynamic with stochastic state variables.
2. History should be allowed to affect the equilibrium outcomes.
3. Responses to out—of—equilibrium soves should depend on the
institutional features of the market (including past interactions) and
the nature of the particular out—of-equilibrium move.BIlL! OCRAPHY
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